It’s becoming increasingly clear that arrest
quotas are not the product of errant C.O.s who choose to impose them
in reaction to pressure exerted by Compstat to meet crime-reduction
targets. It appears, rather, they are being actively encouraged by
senior commanders. Remarkably, these commanders include those with
responsibility for the department's most valuable resource —
its personnel. As the article on page 4 regarding the Performance
Monitoring program (PMP) shows, senior department officials are speaking
openly and approvingly of arrest quotas (i.e., two a quarter are not
enough). This is even more troubling when the official speaking those
words is responsible for overseeing a program (the PMP) that deprives
a police officer of all discretionary (and some non-discretionary)
benefits based on vague and arbitrary criteria.
Arrest quotas are bad for the department — but
more importantly, bad for New York City police officers — for
a number of reasons. First, it’s bad public policy to have a
system that sets arrest quotas, then grades performance primarily,
if not exclusively, on that criterion. A system that could be seen
by the public to reward police officers for making arrests or punish
those who don’t calls into question all bona fide arrests made
by our members every day. Crime deterrence, suppression of conditions
leading to crime, and the rapid apprehension of lawbreakers, rather
than simply numbers, should be our members’ objectives.
Second, the absence of arrests does not equal officer
ineffectiveness, nor are numerous arrests proof of officer effectiveness.
We have all known excellent officers whose effectiveness was based
on factors other than arrests. And while trained and seasoned professional
officers can generate truly extraordinary arrest activity, other factors
like the nature of assignment, time of day, weather, etc., may influence
the number of arrests an officer makes in a given period. Incredibly,
we’re being told that members with only a handful of days on
patrol for valid reasons are expected to generate arrest activity
as if they had been on patrol on every day of the entire reporting
period, creating further incentives to deprive someone of liberty
because of tight time constraints imposed to effect the required arrests.
Third, a system that requires or is perceived to require
summonses or arrests in a situation where an officer may give an appropriate
warning and achieve the same result turns a potential win-win situation
into another negative police-citizen contact. Whether a summons is
issued or an arrest is made (in other than must-arrest situations)
should be left to the officer’s discretion. He or she is the
one who must articulate probable cause in court and who most closely
interacts with the public. Quotas will lead to the erosion of public
support that is so valuable to effective policing. Recall how only
recently the department took a beating when summons quotas were producing
ridiculous results like ticketing an eighty-year-old for feeding pigeons
or a pregnant woman for sitting on the stairs in a transit facility.
That type of publicity does little for the department’s reputation.
Professional, highly trained officers observing events and circumstances
as they unfold are in the best position to make the call on the type
of enforcement activity necessary to address a situation. Quotas interfere
with that discretion.
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Police officers rely on citizens’
support to do the increasingly difficult and important policing job
they do each day. This applies not only to on-duty activities. We saw
dramatically in the last round of contract negotiations how important
citizens are in our fight for fair pay. When the PERB panel issued a
draft decision calling for ten extra appearances, our members were joined
in Times Square by thousands of ordinary citizens. This turnout helped
beat back that unfair award. In this round, all the voices from various
citizen quarters heightened the awareness of the poor compensation system
for police officers. Citizen support in contract negotiations is invaluable
and has been increasingly so since police officers and superior officers
began leaving the electorate of the city for the suburbs decades ago.
(Sixty percent of our members still reside in the five boroughs and
relatively fewer superior officers are city residents.)
Finally, and perhaps most crucially, when officers need assistance
and information, citizens often furnish the information and actively
aid, or make the calls in aid of, officers in need. The most valuable
tool for an effective police officer is a respectful and supportive
public. We’re not saying arrests should not be made when required
or necessary. However, in a job that inherently produces negative police-citizen
contacts of its own force, such contacts should not be multiplied unnecessarily
or magnified by pressures flowing from quotas.
Management will suggest that the lack of arrest quotas will lead to
increased crime or that those who don’t make a certain number
of arrests are slackers, as it appears was being suggested by the commander
in the page-4 PMP article. We disagree. Police officers, like everybody,
have various aptitudes. Some senior commanders have spent an entire
career, or a great portion of it, in non-patrol functions and no one
in the department has ever questioned whether they’ve been of
service to the department and the city. (Parenthetically, we are unaware
of any officer headquartered in One Police Plaza who is in the Performance
Monitoring Program.) Patrol officers have always been a group made up
of people who like to make collars and have the skill-set for it and
of people who, for a variety of reasons, can police differently and
effectively, providing the city valuable service while making relatively
fewer arrests. This is particularly true in an era when patrol strength
has shrunk by thousands, forcing those who remain to pick up the workload.
By way of illustration, an experienced and articulate police officer
assigned to a busy patrol command came to see us recently and complained
of being the subject of retaliation for failing to meet the “number”
of required “C summonses.” With respect to C summonses,
which are often issued in lieu of arrest and are not covered by anti-quota
law, the principle is largely the same. This officer had a difficult
foot post. When pressed by supervisors to issue C summonses, the officer
reacted: I should be afforded the discretion to police the area in the
manner I choose, provided that crime and conditions are being kept in
check. His view was that he was not going to go out of his way to write
decent, otherwise law-abiding citizens C or quality-of-life summonses
for minor violations. He needed the support of those citizens to do
the job he had to do on his post and believed that such heavy-handed
summonsing could undermine community support and curtail information
that was helpful in getting his job done. As for the criminal or disruptive
element, he believed that such summonses were largely ineffective and
that there were other, more effective ways to deal with them. This view
echoes the sentiments of other police officers we speak to on a regular
basis.
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According to officers with an historical
perspective, the high crime rate in this city in the 1980’s was
not the product of police officers not making enough arrests or taking
appropriate enforcement action, but it was the result of uniformed officers
being largely discouraged from taking enforcement action against visible
and known conditions in the commands, particularly drug conditions.
The result was the explosion of drug and collateral crime seen in the
late 1980s. Adding to the problem, the department model at the time
was largely reactive, rather than proactive. When the cuffs were taken
off police officers, they rose to the occasion in the early 1990s to
take on the serious threats facing the city and made historic strides
in bringing down crime. Officers feel that while that fight resulted
in numbers being produced, outputs were problem- or condition-driven,
rather than numbers-driven. Now, members believe that numbers, whether
for traffic violations or crime, are being generated for the sake of
numbers, or to fill the city coffers, or to appease community groups
complaining about reduced police staffing. Policing is a job, unlike
others in significant ways, that is not always subject to meaningful
numerical evaluation. Meeting a number is not necessarily a sign that
a problem is being addressed.

What is the union doing to address the issue? On the legislative front,
the PBA is supporting legislation to strengthen and supplement an existing
quota law that now deals only with vehicular and traffic summons quotas
to include arrest quotas. The existing law is considered largely ineffective
by anyone who has to litigate under it. Better statutory law would allow
stronger enforcement by the union. Second, as far back as 1999, the
union had put together a summons-quota affidavit that can be filled
out in aid of a proceeding under the existing statute alleging an unlawful
quota. The form may also be found on the PBA Web Site. Based on numerous
quota affidavits received from police officers, the PBA is currently
prosecuting a group grievance on behalf of patrol officers arising out
of a C.O.’s alleged maintenance of summons quotas.
Finally, recognizing that arrest quotas are, amazingly, not currently
unlawful under state statute, the PBA is investigating the possibility
of bringing a court proceeding to have declared void as violating public
policy the department’s arrest-quotas practice. In aid of this
proceeding, the union is looking to gather documentary evidence that
would supplement what officers are communicating to us verbally so as
to demonstrate more effectively in court what most working officers
know to be the case — that arrest quotas are a department practice
and policy. After evaluating that evidence, we hope to proceed in state
court with a lawsuit. We ask anyone who has written evidence of this
practice, or who has had his or her conditions of employment changed
for not meeting an arrest quota, to contact his or her union delegate,
trustee or the PBA office directly.
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