A PUBLIC DEBATE

THE PBA'S BARGAINING PHILOSOPHY
AND OTHER POLICE UNIONS

After rendering of the PERB award, we had some police union officials, and others who have been part of the uniform unions' failed bargaining strategy of the 1990's, publicly criticizing the PBA PERB Arbitration Award. Since these individuals have chosen to have the debate publicly, which I welcome, I will set forth my reasons for disagreeing with their bargaining strategy and point out the devastating effects it has had on police officers in New York City. It leads me to conclude that in order to see real advances in the wages and working conditions of our members and theirs, it is necessary that the old strategies be abandoned by those unions.

While clearly not everything suggested by the evidence, and while the adjustment of salaries of new hires was entirely unmerited, the PERB award was considerably better than the DC 37 settlement, an agreement that not one of these uniform leaders publicly criticized, to my knowledge. Why were these union officials so critical of the PBA arbitration award and not critical of the DC 37 settlement? The reasons, which are reflected in the discussion below, highlight the deficiencies in their bargaining strategies.

PBA'S THEORY OF BARGAINING

Since the election of this administration in 1999, we have pushed for a bargaining system where the market rate of pay of those performing the same or similar jobs in the local area is the most important factor. Since no police job is comparable to the NYPD in many respects, we believe that we should not only be paid a market rate of pay, but that we should be paid at the top of the market.

Our reasoning was grounded in past precedent, fundamental principles of our economic system, common sense and our understanding of the new standards under which PERB operates. First, one of the earliest decisions addressing police officers' compensation in the period after the enactment of the collective bargaining laws in this state found clearly and unequivocally that New York City police officers should be among the highest paid police officers in the country. That decision was rendered in 1968 by a panel chaired by former United States Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, a person who had a tremendous breadth of experience, both on and off the bench. He was not beholden to the City or government for his livelihood, and clearly rendered a correct decision on the merits untainted by City influences. That principle has formed the cornerstone of our collective bargaining strategy from the outset of this administration.

In light of what has gone on in NYC since 1968, one would think that Justice Goldberg had come up with some novel theory of how compensation should be set in the labor market. But he merely affirmed a fundamental tenet of our economic system, i.e., that a buyer must pay the market-rate for a good or service. When we provide a service under the most difficult circumstances, in the superb manner in which we deliver our services, in one of the most-expensive and complex cities in the world, we should be paid at the top of the market.

That principle is also common sense. When acting as a businessman in the private sector, would Mayor Bloomberg pay an unskilled worker the same as a skilled worker? Would he pay a clerical worker the same as an executive or an accountant the same as a truck driver? Would he pay employees working in a New York City office the same as a Texas office? Would he tell his most valued employees that he had to pay them the same as every other employer? Of course not.

He would pay his employees what other employers are paying employees who do like work in the same geographic market. To make sure he could keep those valued employees, he would undoubtedly pay them even more than the market. And that is the basis, and the principles on which we seek to have police officers compensated in the City. Finally, and significantly, the PERB standard, in our view, requires the comparison of our wages with others performing similar services, i.e., other police officers. We believe New York City police officers should be compensated better, but certainly as well as, other police officers working locally.

Unfortunately, many of the existing leaders of the New York City police unions, excluding the SBA who demonstrated considerable wisdom and resolve in fashioning its two-year contract, disagree with our theory of bargaining. They come out of the school of bargaining called "bargaining by cover." The theory of that type of bargaining is that as long as no other union receives more in bargaining, you can have the "cover" of saying you did as well as everyone else, even if that means accepting a zero wage increase. Under that theory of bargaining, police unions received 3 1/2 years of zero wage increases in the 1990's. It is all about being reelected and not about doing what is best for your members. In short, that discredited theory of bargaining is largely responsible for the hole we find ourselves in now.

This is why none of these unions was critical of DC 37's zero and 3% settlement, but all were publicly critical of the PBA's 5% and 5% Arbitration award. (Apparently, they also don't consider a zero raise a giveback, notwithstanding inflation's role of diminishing the purchasing power of our wage every single year). After that decision, these "leaders" would need to make a decision. They would not be able to hide behind their brethren in other, non-police unions.

What is more surprising is that, while the LBA leader publicly stated that he would voluntarily accept a 3% and 3% increase in bargaining before the PBA award, he was publicly critical of the PBA award. According to statements attributed to him in the July 5th, 2005, Chief, the LBA leader said "[t]his award does not do much to help all of the unions." In that same piece, the UFA president, Steve Cassidy, offers the best response to the LBA leader's ridiculous assertion:

"Anyone who doesn't think this was a victory can take the zero, three and one [the DC37 deal] and sign on the dotted line. The UFA is not going to do that, make no mistake about it."

We believe that this is an unprincipled manner of bargaining in that it is largely, if not entirely, driven by what the employer will offer — and no more. For example, it is not linked to what others performing the same or similar duties make; it is not linked to a rate of inflation, as you will see below; it is not linked to private sector raises. In most rounds in the last 15 years, it has consisted of exactly what the civilians settled for.

Worse yet, part of the tradeoff with this type of bargaining is that you must accept every significant action of the employer, whether detrimental to your members or not. When was the last time you saw any of these unions publicly disagree with an action of the Department or the City? Did they assist in any way our efforts to secure the right to go to PERB? No. (While benefitting from our PERB decisions did they once offer to assist financially? No.) Did they publicly advocate for better pay? No. Have you ever heard them say the pay of Detectives or Lieutenants is not acceptable? No. Did they take issue with the Mayor's plan to spend taxpayer money — money that could be used to fund our inadequate salaries—on a West Side stadium? No. In fact, the DEA endorsed the stadium. So, for the privilege of obtaining exactly what the civilians get and what management offers, you must surrender your right to act like a union.

BARGAIN AS A COALITION?

So, when I was approached by these leaders after being elected in 1999 about engaging in this type of bargaining, I made clear that the PBA would go its own way. In 2000-2002 round of bargaining, the last round under Mayor Giuliani, the other police and fire unions joined the Corrections Unions and the Sanitation Unions and negotiated in a coalition. The group was led by the President of the Correction Officers' union.

While coalition bargaining may be valuable in certain circumstances, I did not see how it aided police officers to be members of a coalition bargaining over wages that included correction officers and sanitation workers. Our analysis of market compensation of those groups in other jurisdictions revealed that correction officers are rarely compensated like police officers and that New York City sanitation is generally considered to be well compensated versus others who perform those tasks. So, to the extent that every group in the coalition received the same raises, those that are relatively better compensated are advantaged by having in the coalition groups, like the police unions, that are compensated poorly by market standards.

We have absolutely nothing against these groups and believe that their members perform valuable services for the City, but when you look at various markets, police officers are in almost all cases better compensated than these groups. Police officers in this City are upwards of 30+% behind many other jurisdictions. A coalition of that kind made absolutely no sense to the PBA and it should not have for other police unions.

In the end, the wage increases received by that group were made possible by the PBA proceeding to PERB. Knowing that the PBA would be going to PERB for the first time in that round, the Giuliani administration sought to box the PBA in by reaching settlement with this coalition so it could argue that the PBA was bound by it. While the City made much of these other settlements in our PERB arbitration, the arbitrators ultimately awarded the PBA the uniformed deal in 24 months, rather than 30 months agreed to by the uniform coalition, resulting in tens of millions of additional monies for our members, the breaking of historical compensation relationships between the unions (except the UFA which effectively withdrew from the coalition after 9/11) and the receipt of an additional amount of almost $5 million dollars in the PBA's Health & Welfare funds.

In the 2002-2004 round, the PBA again far surpassed the civilian settlement, as extensively discussed above.

As a result of our efforts over two rounds of bargaining, we have been able to persuade a PERB arbitrator to adopt the standard that NYC police officers should be among the highest paid in the country. We have gotten an arbitrator to reject lockstep pay comparisons with civilians. Remarkably, we have even been able to get the NYC labor negotiator to agree in sworn testimony with our view of the appropriate standard by which to compensate NYC police officers. In response to the following question in arbitration, the City's Labor Commissioner, Jim Hanley, stated very clearly the following:

Question: Do you see that "Accordingly, it is the unanimous feeling of the mediators that substantial wage and benefit adjustments are mandatory in order that the members of the New York City Police Department be counted among the highest paid officers in the Nation."

Answer: I not only agree with it. I believe that's where we are today, too.

Question: My question was, do you believe that New York City police should be among the highest paid officers of the major cities of the United States

Answer: I believe that we're doing that, yes….

THE ACTIONS OF OTHER POLICE UNIONS

After all that effort, which produced unprecedented agreement by all parties that NYC police officers should be among the highest paid police officers in the country, and that we should be on the road to making what the higher paid police jurisdictions make, other NYPD police unions are looking to go back in time. For example, instead of arguing they should be paid like detectives from other local jurisdictions, one of the most important factors at PERB, or among the highest paid in the country, as the City's Labor Commissioner has conceded is the appropriate standard, the DEA sought to match the PBA deal under the City's old attrition bargaining scheme, which was propped up by the discredited City agency, the Office of Collective Bargaining ("OCB"). That requires the DEA to match the PBA award parameters with only 25% of the PBA's membership and much less turnover. Why should the DEA not be arguing that its detectives should be paid like or better than professional investigators elsewhere?

Similarly, in commenting on the lieutenant's negotiations, the LBA President says "he's waiting to see if the Uniform Firefighters Association ratifies its proposed four-year wage accord." According to the LBA President, "[t]hat will cement the next round of bargaining." Why would a police union leader make that statement? Has he surrendered his bargaining certificate? Why doesn't he simply allow the fire union to negotiate a contract for his members? We understand that the City will be arguing that parity with fire controls, but that is the City argument — why should a police union official be making those statements, particularly when PERB Arbitrator Schmertz specifically found that other union agreements should not govern. Again, he is seeking to lay the blame off to another union for his own contract. The simple truth is that this bargaining is a return to the situation where one size of labor agreement fits all; the position advanced by the City, and one that certain union leaders believe will leave them blameless for anything that happens in bargaining.

UNIFORM DIFFERENTIALS

Another cornerstone of the PBA bargaining strategy is that, regardless of ability to pay, police officers should receive more than civilian workers in any round of bargaining, all other things being equal, but particularly where our compensation continues to be out of line with other jurisdictions. This has often been referred to as the "uniform differential." The differential has existed at various points in the history of bargaining in this City, continuing through the late 1980's, disappearing in the disastrous 1990's, but was resurrected when the PBA put the City at risk by going to PERB in the 2000 round of bargaining. That caused the City to award the uniformed groups that were part of the uniformed coalition over 1% more than civilians. The PBA ultimately got over 2% more on an annualized basis than the civilian settlement in arbitration. We built on that by receiving two 5% raises from PERB in this round of bargaining when the civilians received 3% plus $1,000 over two years, or more than 7% better than civilians. Even those who agree with the City's method of costing agreements, which when reduced of hyperbole valued the differential at close to 3%, must concede that the PBA scored the biggest differential in any round in recent memory.

Again, other police unions have sought to undermine that result. The DEA voluntarily accepted a settlement on behalf of its members that was exactly the same as the civilian settlement in certain years. In fact, the DEA appears to have accepted an amount less than civilians by agreeing to accept 3.0% and 3.15% (the UFT actually received 3.25% in their 4th year) in the final two years of a four year deal. In other words, the DEA inexplicably abandoned any argument for the uniform differential and did not receive the additional percentages over the civilian settlements that were received by uniform groups in the last two rounds of bargaining and for many other rounds in the history of modern bargaining. We are at a loss to explain why the DEA did not press for the additional monies in the form of the uniform differential, valued conservatively at millions and millions of dollars. The concessions are made worse because the Consumer Price Index for urban areas (NYC) is showing a 3.6% yearly rate of price increases. 3% raises do not even keep pace with inflation.

CONCLUSION

This bargaining strategy and the unseemly fact that certain of these uniform police leaders share information with management that undercuts police officers in collective bargaining, and collaborate with other unions whose goals are to undermine the pay and benefits of police officers make them unpalatable as partners in collective bargaining and ultimately bad for the long-term interests of all MOS. For all those reasons, we stand by the PBA's bargaining principles and completely reject the practices of the 1990's, which have put police unions in a gigantic hole from which they are still digging out.